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Understanding Internet Shutdowns:  
A Case Study from Pakistan 
 
BEN WAGNER1 
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria 
 
This article provides an overview of Internet shutdowns in Pakistan, which have become 
an increasingly common phenomenon, with 41 occurring between 2012 and 2017. It 
argues that to understand how shutdowns became normalized in Pakistan, it is necessary 
to look at the specific dynamics of how the shutdowns take place. In doing so, the concept 
of communicative ruptures develops to better understand intentional government 
shutdowns of communications. The article argues that strategic prevention of mobilization 
is key for short-term shutdowns, whereas long-term shutdowns can be better explained 
by looking at disciplinary mechanisms and denying the existence of “others.” The article 
then discusses Internet shutdowns in the wider context of authoritarian practices before 
concluding with the urgent need for further research on this topic, both in Pakistan and 
beyond.  
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On August 14, 2014, the “Interior Ministry . . . ordered mobile phone services to be shut down in 
several parts of Islamabad for an indefinite period” (Bhatti, 2014, para. 1). For three days, large parts of 
the Pakistani capital were disconnected from mobile phone voice and data connectivity. Citizens in these 
areas were not able to use their phones, not able to access mobile Internet (by far the most common form 
of Internet connectivity in Pakistan), and were not able to call emergency services. Why would a government 
suppress all digital communications across a whole city for days on end?  
 
The five-day telecommunications and Internet services shutdown in Egypt in 2011 cost Egypt’s 
economy at least US$90 million, excluding secondary costs, as well as its “reputation among technology 
firms as a stable place for investment” (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011b, p. 231; see also OECD, 2011). 
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Internet shutdowns in Pakistan during Eid in 2012 caused an estimated loss of 507 million Pakistani rupees 
(US$49 million) to the exchequer, and November 2012 shutdowns during Ashura caused losses of 500 
million rupees (US$49.02 million; Purdon, Ashraf, & Wagner, 2015). These high costs would suggest that it 
is almost impossible for shutdowns to be a regular and ongoing occurrence; yet they still happen in Pakistan 
numerous times a year. This leads to the research question: Why are Internet shutdowns so frequent in 
Pakistan?  
 
Internet shutdowns are a surprisingly common phenomena, having occurred in at least 23 countries 
over the past 10 years, including Syria (Gohdes, 2015), Nepal (Ang, Tekwani, & Wang, 2012), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Yemen, 
China, India,2 Zimbabwe (Purdon, Ashraf, & Wagner, 2015), North Korea, Uganda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Turkey, Cameroon, Gambia (Micek & Access Now, 2017), and Myanmar (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 
2011a; Nizza, 2007),3 with the best known being in Egypt in 2011 (OECD, 2011).  
 
Although these are typically justified as security or public order measures, many of the shutdowns 
occur in the context of political rallies, elections, and public assemblies. Although there are clear security 
risks associated with such events, it remains an open question: What is being secured, and from whom? 
There are doubtless considerable elevated security concerns in Pakistan, but the timing of the shutdowns 
and the broad scale through which they are implemented suggests that governance measures are being 
implemented that go beyond reasonable security considerations alone. 
 
Yet despite considerable interest in the case of Egypt in 2011, almost all shutdowns of 
communications—with the exception of Syria (Gohdes, 2015) and Nepal (Ang et al., 2012)—have frequently 
been ignored in the academic literature. The only publication that looks at an extended period before 2011 
(Howard et al., 2011a) mainly lists incidents such as journalist’s harassment or the shutdown of specific 
Internet sites or platforms rather than the shutdown of whole communications networks. Of the 606 
incidents cataloged by Howard et al. (2011a), only four would constitute the kind of Internet shutdowns 
discussed in this article. The countries in which these shutdowns were conducted are Pakistan, blocking 
access in Balochistan; China, blocking access in the Xinjiang region; and Myanmar and Nepal, shutting down 
Internet access across the whole country.  
 
Conceptualization: Defining Internet Shutdowns and Communicative Ruptures 
 
To understand why Internet shutdowns are so frequent in Pakistan, it is important to first clearly 
define them. In the context of this article, Internet shutdowns are defined as intentional disconnections of 
digital communications by government authorities. Such shutdowns frequently include shutting down the 
Internet and mobile phone services as well.  
 
                                               
2 See also https://sflc.in/internet-shutdown-tracker-india-20132016  
3 Within the context of the data from the Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project, only data that fit into the 
category shutdown type “full network” were considered, to ensure that they are congruent with the definition 
of Internet shutdowns used in this article. 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  Understanding Internet Shutdowns  3919 
However, in contrast to other definitions of shutdowns developed by Howard et al. (2011a) or Micek 
and Access Now (2017), the definition used here does not include the shutting down of large Internet 
platforms such as Facebook or YouTube. This definition is thus focused on the suppression of most digital 
communications mechanisms in a specific geographic area. To more accurately conceptualize the effects of 
Internet shutdowns, this article proposes the concept of communicative ruptures to help understand this 
relatively novel social phenomenon. Communicative ruptures are the intended effects of a shutdown; they 
are what happens in a society when communications networks are intentionally disconnected. Ruptures are 
not identical to the disconnection of Internet or mobile phone connectivity but instead are separate social 










Figure 1. Overview of definition of key concepts by the author. 
 
 
Importantly, what differentiates communicative ruptures from a simple technical failure is the 
intent of a governmental actor to disconnect networks. This intent is important, as it has specific effects on 
the way in which shutdowns affect local populations. Internet shutdowns are usually instituted by 
government actors in very specific contexts such as mass demonstrations, elections, perceived security 
threats, or counterterrorism operations. However, they also take place preemptively around events 
perceived as sensitive, such as mass public gatherings around national holidays or visits of high-ranking 
state officials. 
 
Notably, societies across the world are increasingly dependent on communications infrastructure. 
Telecommunications, the Internet, and other information services have become critical social infrastructures 
(de Bruijne, van Eeten, Roe, & Schulman, 2006), woven into the communicative fabric of societies to the 
point that many citizens find it difficult to imagine living without them (Bank of America & Braun Research 
Inc, 2014; Tyers, 2013; York, 2010). In the context of postmodernity, space and place are increasingly in 
flux—not only condensed but also conditioned by communication (Harvey, 1993). At the same time, media 
communications are a key “locus of power and a contested political space” (Wagner, 2016, p. 4), which 
have historically been extensively governed by the state (Green & Karolides, 2005; Hoffmann-Riem, 1996). 
Governing the public sphere is seen as a key part of building nation states (Bhabha, 1990), but frequently 
leads to censorship and highly restrictive control of communications (D. Jones, 2001). Although Internet 
shutdowns are typically portrayed primarily as a means of censorship (Howard et al., 2011a), this portrayal 
may not entirely be accurate. Indeed, as the work of Gohdes (2015) and Purdon et al. (2015) suggests, 
Internet shutdowns serve numerous purposes beyond the suppression of information alone. Thus, it is 
important to study Internet shutdowns as a distinct phenomenon, separate from Internet censorship. The 
Government  Internet Shutdown Demands Leading to 
Communicative 
Rupture 
Type of Actor 
of Service 
Access 
Societal Effect Technical State 
of Shutdown 
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main existing literature on Internet censorship was developed by the OpenNet Initiative, which has 
developed a concept of “generations” of Internet censorship, which they define as follows: 
 
1. The first generation focused on “filtering systems at the backbone of the country’s 
Internet . . . represents the first generation of Internet control techniques” (Deibert 
& Rohozinski, 2010a, p. 4). 
 
2. The “second-generation controls aim to create a legal and normative environment 
and technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information 
resources as and when needed” (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010b, p. 24). 
 
3. “The key characteristic of third-generation controls is that the focus is less on denying 
access than successfully competing with potential threats through effective 
counterinformation campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents” 
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010b, p. 27). 
 
4. The “fourth phase . . . we call ‘access contested.’ Although the central characteristics 
of the previous phases remain relevant, the key notion of this phase . . . is that the 
contest over access has burst into the open” (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 
2011, p. 14). 
 
These approaches focus on influencing what information can be accessed and what information in 
the public sphere will be widely read. These forms of Internet censorship could therefore be surmised as a 
form of public sphere curation, as a specific authoritarian practice. By limiting access to specific content or 
specific websites or discrediting citizen journalism, Internet censorship is trying to shift and shape the public 
sphere. 
 
By contrast, Internet shutdowns, as defined here as intentional blocking of almost all forms of 
digital communications, are very different phenomena. They differ from Internet censorship in several 
different ways: 
 
1. Internet shutdowns do not discriminate regarding content. Instead, they block all 
content and do not attempt to discriminate what kind of content they block, whereas 
Internet censorship targets specific items or types of content. 
 
2. Internet shutdowns encompass all forms of digital communication. Although Internet 
censorship only affects Internet communications, Internet shutdowns typically also 
directly affect mobile phone and sometimes even other forms of telephony. This 
makes the scope of communications affected significantly broader. 
 
3. Internet shutdowns have different effects than Internet censorship, as they have an 
entirely different scope and the focus of the measure is different. Although in the 
context of Internet censorship some digital communication is still possible, and some 
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access to uncensored content exists, this is not the case during Internet shutdowns. 
As a result, communicative ruptures can only meaningfully be discussed in the context 
of Internet shutdowns and not in the context of Internet censorship. 
 
4. Internet shutdowns have a different intent than does Internet censorship, as their 
focus is not on a specific piece of content but rather on the act of communication 
itself.  
 
Thus, in the context of studying authoritarian governance mechanisms, it is important to 
differentiate between the two mechanisms, which are highly distinct and need to be studied accordingly. 
 
Internet shutdowns should thus be considered a distinct phenomenon and are worthy of further 
study for several additional reasons. Politically, they are closely connected to human rights violations and 
threats to democracy and freedom. They are typically used in times of crisis and often deprive protestors of 
key means of communication and organization as well as depriving the surrounding society of associated 
services (Perera, 2015). They are also often used before elections to limit mobilization ability of certain 
political parties or social groups (Julliard, 2011). Sometimes governments will even try to hide their 
shutdown requests and claim that digital communications have failed because of a technical error (da Silva, 
2015). 
 
Internet Shutdowns as an Authoritarian Practice 
 
To say that Internet shutdowns manifest existing societal conflict is not to say that they take place 
without intent, however. If anything, the intent is crucial for understanding the phenomenon that is taking 
place. The authoritarian intent around shutdowns is also what differentiates shutdowns from simple technical 
errors. Rather—following Glasius’s concept of authoritarian practices4—they are a measure that has a 
specific repressive effect on the population and attempts through its implementation to limit transparency 
and accountability. Importantly, communicative ruptures are not the same thing as Internet censorship, a 
similarly complex an important phenomenon. This is reinforced by the frequent linkage between 
communicative ruptures and mobile phone disconnections, heavily influencing the lifeworlds of individuals 
and the way they are able to interact with each other digitally as a society.  
 
Building on the definition of authoritarian practices by Glasius and Michaelsen (2018), it is 
important to acknowledge the differences between the approach of this text and Glasius and Michaelsen’s 
definition of authoritarian practices. Specifically, the suggestion that authoritarian practices “disable access 
to information and disable voice” (Glasius & Michaelsen 2018, p. 2) is an important but insufficient for 
conceptualizing Internet shutdowns. Rather they attack the fabric of society itself and attempt to prevent 
communicative interaction. This is not merely about preventing information getting out, but rather about 
preventing information from existing at all. Thus, this text proposes to extend that definition to encompass 
not just the disabling of access to information or voice but the active attack on the existence of voice 
                                               
4 See the Introduction of this Special Section. 
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(Michaelsen, 2016; O’Donnell, 1986). In this definition, the social effect of shutdowns is adequately reflected 
and integrated into a wider context of authoritarian practices.  
 
However, this fits well into Glasius and Michaelsen’s (see this Special Section) definition of 
“sabotaging of accountability” (p. 3). Both in their implementation and in their effects, shutdowns are 
actively constructed to limit the accountability of government in that they prevent political mobilization and 
public protest, prevent information about human rights violations from being documented and actively 
repress digital community relations in remote regions. As will be explained in greater detail below, the 
process that leads to shutdowns also actively hampers accountability by ensuring that it is essentially 
impossible to question or challenge the process. It is also possible to suggest that regular shutdowns make 
living in the affected areas more difficult, raising the likelihood of exit (i.e., leaving from the regions most 
affected by ruptures or even the whole country; Michaelsen, 2016; O’Donnell, 1986). However, this 
suggestion was not sufficiently studied within this article to make a definitive claim about its veracity. 
  
Finally, there is a last important distinction in the way Glasius and Michaelsen (see this Special 
Section) use authoritarian practices and the way it is used here. In their definition, there is a “digital realm 
[where] illiberal practices typically constitute interferences with freedom of expression or the right to 
privacy” (p. 4). As I do not believe it is possible to meaningfully differentiate between digital and physical 
realm, I would argue instead for focusing on sociotechnical lifeworlds (Kitchin & Dodge, 2011) in which 
socially constructed technologies reside (Brey, 2005). Moreover, in this sociotechnical world, effects on 
lifeworlds are not just related to freedom of expression of privacy, but rather encompass all rights and all 
imaginable effects on human beings. In the specific case of Internet shutdowns, freedom of assembly and 
freedom of movement are heavily affected, but there will also be many other examples of authoritarian 
practices where both intent and effect are not primarily oriented on freedom of expression. Thus, this article 
argues instead for considering authoritarian practices—whether digitally mediated or otherwise—as having 
a considerable intentional effect on human rights in a manner that actively sabotages accountability. 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
 
Within this context, Pakistan is by far the most interesting case internationally. No other country 
can even come close to the 41 Internet shutdowns Pakistan has witnessed in the past five years. Shutdowns 
have become so common that they are an established part of precautionary measures taken within the 
security apparatus. For example, to prepare for celebrations around Defense Day in Pakistan on September 
6, 2016, the government decided to shut down communications in the capital city not just on the day itself 
but also as a precaution during the preparations on September 5, 2016. Similar precautions were taken for 
the ceremony celebrating the Change of Command for the chief of the Army staff in Rawalpindi on November 
29, 2016, where mobile phone and Internet services were shut down in the entire city as a security 
precaution. Thus, Pakistan represents a particularly interesting case that is worthy of further study. 
 
Having selected Pakistan as a case, the field research consisted of several research trips to 
Pakistan, from November 10 to 19, 2014, and from February 2 to March 1, 2015. During these field trips, 
23 expert interviews (Mason, 2002, p. 231) were conducted using nonprobability chain sampling (Tansey, 
2007) with current and former government officials, members of civil society, NGOs, and representatives of 
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private sector companies. The purpose of these interviews was to understand the actual decision-making 
process behind Internet shutdowns in Pakistan, as well as the motivations of actors involved in the shutdown 
process. 
 
Studying this phenomenon is relatively difficulty in Pakistan, as it is a highly sensitive matter that 
is frequently discussed in terms of national security, and most interview partners were only willing to speak 
on condition of anonymity. As a result, details were removed from interviews that would allow for the names, 
identities, or professional positions of interviewees to be identified. 
 
Because of the sensitivity of the questions being asked, it was often necessary to contact 
interviewees through trusted intermediaries. Access to these interviews was typically made possible either 
through collaboration with Bytes for All or IHRB, who were crucial in helping to set up interviews. Although 
this brings with it issues related to the role of these organizations as gatekeepers (Parsons, Johnson, 
Warnecke, & Kaluzny, 1993), no issues related to their role as a gatekeeper transpired during the interview 
process. Through conducting these interviews, it was possible to build an accurate picture of the decision-
making process around Internet shutdowns in Pakistan.  
 
Based on data from media reports and individual reports collected in Pakistan, Bytes for All was 
able to document 41 Internet shutdowns between 2012 and 2017, which it has published on 
http://www.killswitch.pk/. These data from Pakistan are also included as part of the international KeepItOn 
campaign by the NGO AccessNow, which has developed its own shutdown tracker.5 The Bytes for All 
database was used as the basis for the data used in this article about the frequency of and reasoning for 
Internet shutdowns in Pakistan. Together with the Bytes for All data and additional publicly available online 
media sources used to corroborate the data provided by Bytes for All, a time series of all 41 shutdowns from 
2012 to 2017 was developed and can be seen below. 
 
Internet Shutdowns in Pakistan 
 
Internet shutdowns first took place in Pakistan in 2005 as part of a wider military and anti-
insurgency campaign in Balochistan (El-Khawas, 2009, p. 103). However, similar ruptures did not take place 
in the rest of Pakistan until 2012, when the Interior Minister Rahman Malik began ordering mobile network 
shutdowns. Since then, they have remained a relatively consistent occurrence in Pakistan and continue to 
this day. The frequency of these shutdowns varies but has remained relatively consistent in the past five 
years, as shown in Figure 2. 
                                               
5 See https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-shutdown-tracker/ for further details. 
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Figure 2. Overview of Internet shutdowns in Pakistan from 2012 to 2017.6 
 
The scope of the shutdowns is also extremely variable and ranges from parts of Islamabad to the 
entire country. Some requests for shutdowns are also extremely diverse in their effects, “impact[ing] a total 
of 56 cities and towns in the regions of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan 
and Azad Kashmir” (Purdon et al., 2015, p. 18). However, there are certain patterns that emerge when 
looking more closely at the data of shutdowns. They can broadly be categorized into short term shutdowns 
(up to one week) and long-term shutdowns (several weeks or months). 
 
Within the short-term shutdowns, these generally fall into the following five categories:  
 
1. Celebrations around national political holidays, like Pakistan Day or Independence 
Day.  
 
2. Celebrations around religious holidays, like Ashura or Eid ul-Fitar. 
 
                                               
6 The overview is based on data from http://www.killswitch.pk/, which is collected and published by Arsalan 
Ashraf at Bytes for All. Based on previous collaboration with Bytes for All, which include research and data 
collection trainings conducted by the author in Islamabad, the author is confident that the data collected is 
sound. 
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3. Large political marches, strikes, or sit-ins, typically in the capital city Islamabad or 
Rawalpindi (which are both very close to each other and are often considered to be 
twin cities in one large metropolitan area), but also elsewhere in the country. 
 
4. High-level political events, such as the visit of the Chinese prime minister or the 
Change of Command in the Armed Forces. 
 
5. Perceived security threats, typically unspecified, which require shutdowns as a 
precaution. 
 
The above Internet shutdowns typically take place for one day, although they are sometimes 
extended for up to a week. Such short-term shutdowns need to be seen in a distinct context from long-term 
shutdowns that take place for longer periods of weeks or months. These types of shutdowns typically take 
place in remote parts of Pakistan, such as Balochistan or the tribal region (“Suspension of Mobile Phone 
Services,” 2017). To provide just two of the most recent examples: 
 
• On March 15, 2017, the Pakistani government “suspended all mobile phone services 
throughout the entire tribal [region] without any notice and unknown reason at once” 
(“Suspension of Mobile Phone Services,” 2017, para. 1). The disconnected mobile phone 
networks had not been restored almost four months later on July 9, 2017, as “mobile 
phone services remained suspended” (“Mobile Phone Services,” 2017, para. 1).  
 
• In February 2017, the Pakistani government suspended Internet services in 
Dalbandin, a city in the Balochistan region. Six months later, on August 19, 2017, the 
shutdown was still in place, and it was unclear when Internet connectivity would be 
restored. 
 
The above overview was meant to provide a more general picture of Internet shutdowns in Pakistan 
without going into too much detail about the reasons for shutdowns. How and why short-term and long-
term shutdowns take place will be explained in greater detail in the following sections. 
 
The Process That Leads to Shutdowns in Pakistan 
 
The process of shutdowns within Pakistan needs to be seen within the context of the overall political 
system there. The Pakistani civilian government is relatively weak and faced with a strong military, which 
has far greater power (Idris, 2016). Like other countries that have exemplified similar politically powerful 
military forces like Turkey, the Pakistani military enforces its power through regular coups to topple 
unfriendly civilian governments, which were conducted in 1958, 1977, and 1999 (Narli, 2000). 
Communications shutdowns are one of the examples of such engagement, with strong suggestions in the 
interviews conducted in Pakistan that a considerable proportion of shutdown orders stem directly from the 
Pakistani military. 
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These shutdown orders from the military and other security agencies are sent to the National Crisis 
Management Cell (NCMC), a unit within the interior ministry responsible for liaising between military and 
civilian agencies. The NCMC typically makes a determination on shutdowns, although one interviewee with 
experience working in the Pakistani government described the process of issuing a shutdown order as 
“mechanical.”7 Because the issue of Internet and mobile phone shutdowns “relates to national security,”8 
there is an unwillingness among political parties and parliamentarians to challenge the measure or even talk 
about them widely.  
 
Beyond this, it seems that Internet shutdowns as a precautionary measure had already, at the end 
of 2014, become “part of the standard operating procedures”8 of the NCMC in various situations that were 
perceived as relevant to national security. This mechanical and standardized approach to decision making 
around shutdowns would help to explain considerably why shutdowns are so frequent and seem to have 
become so “normal” in Pakistan. There are some examples where the decision is also taken by another 
specialized unit within the Ministry of Interior, such as the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NCTA; 
Bhatti, 2014), but in the majority of cases, the decision for shutdowns is taken within the NCMC. 
 
The decisions made by the NCMC or other units within the Ministry of Interior are then sent to the 
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). The PTA is a classic telecommunications regulator, similar to 
those that exist in many different countries, and is responsible for implementing government 
telecommunications policy in numerous different areas, for example, by licensing telephone and Internet 
providers in Pakistan. It is also responsible for enforcing Internet censorship decisions, with 597 links 
required to be removed by the PTA from 2006 to 2013.  
 
Although the PTA is the “enforcement agency,” it does not have the capability to question the 
decision or the manner of its enforcement. It simply has to ensure that the shutdowns take place and has 
the ability to fine telecommunications operators that do not comply, and in the most extreme cases it could 
theoretically withdraw their telecommunications license. The orders are issued by the PTA under section 54 
of the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organization) Act. As noted by an interviewee who runs a 
leading telecommunications company in Pakistan, NCMC has “no public interface,”8 and its determinations 
of a national security threat cannot be contested. As a result, it is impossible for telecommunications 
companies to challenge decisions of the NCMC, as their decisions cannot be scrutinized. This is particularly 
the case as there is no formal legal process to authorize shutdowns, but rather an established practice over 
time that the NCMC will typically take responsibility. But sometimes shutdown orders will also be issued by 
another unit within the Ministry of Interior, such as the NCTA (see Figure 3). 
 
                                               
7 Interview with former senior Pakistani government official, November 12, 2014. 
8 Interview with head of large communications company in Pakistan, November 13, 2014. 
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Figure 3. Process of decision making about Internet shutdowns in Pakistan. 
 
The result is a lack of accountability of decisions on Internet shutdowns, within which both the 
providers who have to implement the shutdowns as well as the citizens affected by it have no form of legal 
recourse to challenge the decision. This ambiguity in which authority is even responsible for issuing 
shutdown orders further challenges even basic accountability, with decisions frequently made by the NCMC 
but sometimes also authored by the NCTA. Moreover, the decisions are publicly justified on such a vague 
basis, such as “impending security threats,”9 that they are very difficult to contest politically. The nature of 
the decisions made is thus evidently constructed in a manner to evade accountability and can thus be 
considered an authoritarian practice.9 This is particularly the case given the military–civilian imbalance in 
Pakistan, where the military wishes to influence everyday politics, but is often unable to do so overtly.  
 
This unaccountable decision-making process is also evident in the vague public statements made 
by public authorities when shutting down communications; for example, the “mobile phone service in the 
region was suspended owing to security reasons. It was meant to further improve law and order in the 
agency especially in the border areas” (“Mobile Phone Service Suspended,” 2016, para. 6). 
 
The current system of lacking accountability and unclear authorship shields both the Pakistani 
military from having to publicly take responsibility for a shutdown as well as the responsible agency within 
the Ministry of Interior from having to justify its choices and the intelligence these choices are based on to 
                                               
9 See Glasius and Michaelsen’s contribution to this Special Section. 
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the general public. While they can of course benevolently choose to do so as they see fit, this process neither 
promotes accountability nor provides checks and balances to limit or prevent shutdowns within the existing 
process of governance. 
 
How Did the Concept of Internet Shutdowns Reach Pakistan? 
 
It is hard to say for certain where Internet shutdowns as a policy measure originally come from. 
The following paragraphs are thus an attempt to understand plausible paths of development and the 
dissemination of authoritarian practice. 
 
As there is a considerable body of military literature on “disrupting enemy communications” (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1944, p. 558), and many of the earliest Internet shutdowns were employed 
as an anti-insurgency or antiterror tactic, it seems plausible that the origins of such shutdowns may be in 
military circles. The origin of Internet shutdowns may be in Northern Ireland, where communications 
jamming was commonly used to prevent the detonation of bombs and to prevent oppositional radio 
broadcasts (Oppenheimer, 2009). It would be plausible that such tactics could conceivably have traveled 
from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan and Iraq, where in both countries providing mobile connectivity was 
a central part of anti-insurgency military strategies (Shapiro & Siegel, 2015). However it should be noted 
that while in Afghanistan mobile phone towers were actively attacked by the Taliban—leading new towers 
to be primarily built on U.S. military bases for protection (Glanz & Markoff, 2011)—access to the Internet 
was far more heavily contested in Iraq, where providing or removing Internet access was a key part of the 
anti-insurgency strategy of the military coalition there (Shapiro & Siegel, 2015). 
 
From Iraq and Afghanistan, it is plausible that the strategy of shutdowns could then have traveled 
to Balochistan, where it was first employed by the Pakistani government in 2005. In Balochistan and in the 
tribal regions primarily, long-term shutdowns were common until 2012, when shutdowns began to spread 
to other parts of the country. It is quite possible that the reason for this spread was not an internal Pakistani 
but rather an external event: the shutdowns of mobile and Internet communications in Cairo and other parts 
of Egypt during the Arab uprisings. Before this event in Cairo—which was the highest profile shutdown event 
up until then—shutdowns were a relatively uncommon event at a global level. This is not to say that Cairo 
was necessarily a successful event of a shutdown—far from it. Rather, the events around the Internet and 
telephone shutdown in Cairo exemplified to a global audience that shutdowns were possible. It thus serves 
less as a good example of effectiveness and rather as a proof of concept that governments have the capacity 
to take such measures.  
 
Why Are Shutdowns So Frequent in Pakistan? 
 
When asking why shutdowns are so frequent in Pakistan, security threats alone do not seem to be 
a sufficient explanation. While Pakistan doubtless faces numerous security threats, so do many other 
countries. As noted by one of the interviewees with experience of working in government, “many countries 
face terrorism . . . they don’t block . . . why do we?” Because of the secretive nature of national security 
justifications, it is impossible to assess the actual effectiveness of shutdowns in increasing security and 
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preventing terrorism effectively. In the context of promoting security, two arguments are typically made in 
favor of Internet and mobile phone shutdowns. 
 
First, it is typically suggested that mobile phones can be used as a trigger for explosive devices. 
While this is certainly true, there are numerous other trigger mechanisms for explosive devices, and shutting 
down communications across a whole country for hours, days, or weeks does not seem like a particularly 
effective mechanism to prevent the usage of explosive devices. Indeed, it seems that terrorist groups in 
Pakistan have adapted to use numerous forms of explosive devices going beyond mobile-phone triggers 
alone (Barker, 2011; S. G. Jones & Johnston, 2013). 
 
Second, Internet communications can be used to spread information swiftly. In politically tense 
situations, it is argued that the swift spread of information can have harmful side effects, such as political 
violence or social unrest. Although there are some cases where this has happened,10 the core of the latter 
argument seems to be to prevent political mobilization. Although disrupting communications may be one 
way of doing this, it is by no means the only way and has considerable side effects. Moreover, the propensity 
of misuse of these types of shutdowns is high, particularly in the context of mass mobilization and political 
events such as rallies or elections. A particular likelihood of violence is easy to construct around large groups, 
and doing so—if preventing the mobilization is successful—can change the course of a demonstration or an 
election. 
 
Strategic Prevention of Political Mobilization 
 
This also seems to be the context of numerous shutdowns within Pakistan. When the government 
felt threatened by large rallies by political opposition, particularly in the capital city Islamabad or the 
surrounding area of Rawalpindi, there is a strong tendency to shut down mobile and Internet 
communications, often for several days. Here, the strategic implementation of shutdowns is less linked to 
preventing violence and more to suppression of political opponents. Shutdowns are used during political 
demonstrations, at rallies, or at large mass protests.  
 
The most obvious example of shutdowns being used to prevent political mobilization is during the 
Azadi and Inqilab marches of 2014, which were, for a while, suspected to topple the Pakistani government 
with their demands for the resignation of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif due to irregularities in the 
national elections (Idris, 2016; Tariq, 2014). In response, the government shut down mobile phone and 
Internet communications for several days, and in some cases up to a week in many of the places where the 
march took place, such as Islamabad (August 13‒14, 2014; August 23‒27, 2014) and Lahore (August 8‒
13, 2014).  
 
An even more obvious example of preventing political mobilization is the Internet shutdowns during 
the Tahir ul Qadri Long March, which took place to “protest government’s corruption” (Attaa, 2013). During 
the march from Lahore to Islamabad, communications were shut down in every location through which the 
March passed. Thus, shutdowns took place in mid-January 2013 in Karachi, Sindh, Islamabad, Faizabad, 
                                               
10 See https://dangerousspeech.org/ for further details. 
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Shahdara, Punjab, Shahdra, Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore, Do Moria Pull, Garhi Shahu, Dharampura, Shahrah-
e-Quaid-e-Azam, and Ichhra (Attaa, 2013). The Pakistani government even went as far as shutting down 
communications on specific roads that the March was passing through, as such the Imamia Colony Road 
and the Ravi Bridge. Although ostensibly to protect the security of those marching, the intended effect was 
evidently to prevent the mobilization of additional Pakistani citizens in close proximity to those marching. 
 
Communicative Ruptures: A Punitive Disciplinary Tool 
 
Notably, these kinds of shutdowns around political marches or mass demonstrations are limited in 
time to a maximum of a week. They are thus in contrast to some of the long-term shutdowns that take 
place in some of the more fringe parts of Pakistan, such as Balochistan or the tribal region. This distinction 
in the approach to shutdowns is important, as it suggests that there may be different intent involved. As 
will be argued here, the month-long shutdowns common in Balochistan and the tribal region follow a 
different logic, which is less about strategically preventing mobilization and more a disciplinary tool of 
authoritarian repression.  
 
To understand why such shutdowns take place, it is important to understand the role of remote 
regions like Balochistan in Pakistan. The shutdowns can be seen part of a wider struggle between Balochistan 
and the national Pakistani government for greater recognition and more political independence (Wirsing, 
2008). The increasing relevance of Balochistan energy resources and networks for national Pakistani 
strategic interests is evident, as “sprawling, mineral-rich Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan and 
constitutes approximately 44% of the country’s total land mass” (Ahmad & Dad, 2011, para. 1). 
 
These conditions have led the Pakistani government to employ a policy of “zero tolerance and 
ruthless crushing of the insurgency” (Wirsing, 2008, p. vi). Within this context, frequent, long-term 
communications shutdowns were exceedingly common since 2005. Although it has not been possible to 
document the exact number of communicative ruptures, individuals familiar with the matter suggest that 
they are both common and very extensive, lasting for weeks or months, and taking place many times per 
year. Similarly,  
 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has for many decades been 
marginalized. . . . Furthermore, prior to . . . August 2011 no political representation was 
allowed to function in the tribal areas. In the absence of a vibrant political process, there 
has been no platform to address grievances or to contribute to local or national affairs. 
(Shinwari, 2012, pp. 17–19) 
 
Much like Balochistan, there are ongoing struggles between the central political administration and 
remote region for recognition and agency within the Pakistani process of governance. Shutdowns thus need 
to be seen in this context, within which specific remote regions experience long-term punitive shutdowns 
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Denying the Existence of “Others” Over Extended Periods  
 
However, simply describing such measure as punitive, repressive, or disciplinary does not fully do 
them justice. It is important to note in this context that this is not just any form of disciplinary interaction, 
but rather one that specifically targets everyday societal communications. In Pakistan, government actors 
frequently initiate network disconnections to target the activities of specific, often-marginalized groups. 
Social life for large portions of the population can be considerably slowed and reduced to in-person 
encounters or one-to-many communication through TV or radio. Space and “symbolic proximity” (Wurtzel 
& Turner, 1976) are also significantly expanded, as the distance becomes far more difficult to traverse. In 
Pakistan, conflicts between groups in society manifest themselves both through forms of physical conflict 
and through the configuration of technological infrastructure. Thus, communications shutdowns serve—to a 
certain degree—to define who is part of Pakistani society and who is not.  
 
Those who are disconnected are quite literally unable to speak in digital form, both to each other 
and to the outside world. This behavior suggests that the Pakistani government does not consider political 
protestors or ethnic minorities, such as the Balochs or those inhabiting the tribal region, full parts of Pakistani 
society. Thus, their disconnection from the communicative interaction is not just a technical but also a 
symbolic act, serving both as a way to discipline a group and define their identity as “others” within society.  
 
This form of exclusion is a more extreme form of what scholars have found to be a prevalent link 
between communications access and the exclusion of specific ethnic groups (Weidmann, Benitez-Baleato, 
Hunziker, Glatz, & Dimitropoulos, 2016). The exclusion of such ethnic groups from Internet service provision 
is suggested to be a result of political bias by Weidmann et al. (2016), an assumption that also holds true 
in Pakistan. Indeed, it may be that the effects of a lack of Internet services provisions are amplified by the 
frequent disconnections for which little Internet service exists. However, it can be also be argued that the 
lack of Internet penetration has a different symbolic effect on the affected population than the forcible 
removal of Internet and mobile phone connectivity over a specific period of time.  
 
Although a lack of access is likely to have longer term structural effects, the latter is likely to be 
more symbolically violent in separating parts of a society from others. It can also be seen as a mechanism 
for preventing communicative interaction between members of a community over an extended period of 
time, essentially a way to “atomise” (Glasius, 2012, p. 362) individuals digitally and separate them from 
other individuals within their society. Glasius suggests that many Latin American and Eastern European 
activists conceive of this atomization of individuals as a key form of authoritarian rule, as authoritarian 
regimes aspire “to freeze and ‘atomise’ society in order to rule for ever” (Glasius, 2012, p. 362). In this 
context, long-term communicative ruptures could be seen as a similar authoritarian mechanism to atomize 
society to prevent the creation of civil societies. At the same time, ruptures have direct effects on the ability 
of a subaltern population to speak for themselves (Spivak, 1988). This is particularly the case in FATA, which 
has more limited political agency than other parts of the country, and the people living in these areas are 
still, in many cases, quite literally “spoken for” by the FATA administration.  
 
Importantly, communications shutdowns are a key tool to restrict information about the conflict 
and the demands of people in Balochistan reaching the outside world:  
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Baloch groups have been waging a nationalist insurgency to protest against the province’s 
underdeveloped conditions; state security forces have tried to suppress this insurgency 
through the abduction, torture, and extrajudicial killings of Baloch separatists and human 
rights activists, and have successfully censored most mainstream media coverage of the 
province. To counter the media vacuum, Baloch activists have launched online 
newspapers, blogs, Facebook groups, and video-sharing channels to facilitate 
communication, document human rights violations, and share photographs of missing 
persons believed to have been abducted by state security forces. (Yusuf, 2013, p. 43) 
 
Thus, not only does shutting down communications make the everyday lives of marginalized groups 
more difficult, it also prevents them from “existing” in a communicative digital context. They are unable to 
document their existence online and make the outside world aware of human rights violations (unrelated to 
the Internet) taking place within their region. Through shutting down the Internet, they have far greater 
difficulty making their voices heard to the national and international communities. Here, too, shutting down 
the Internet serves to prevent transparency and accountability of government action in the tribal areas, as 
the shutdown serves to hide information that would otherwise exist both about a part of the population 
living in a remote area and their specific struggles and conflicts. 
 
Of course, this denying the existence of “others” could also be interpreted as a form of strategic 
prevention of the sharing of information about human rights violations. In this sense, these measures also 
have a strategic component in that they prevent voice and agency for the affected populations. The point 
of the tactics described here is not about denying their strategic component, but rather to argue that the 
motivation goes deeper than just preventing information getting out or preventing political mobilization.  
 
Internet Shutdowns as an Authoritarian Practice 
 
Communications technologies play an important role in society, and as their importance grows, so 
too does the interest in misusing as the basis for authoritarian practices. They extend the reach of the state 
even more deeply into the communicative lifeworlds of individuals.  
 
Having put forward several theories on why shutdowns happen in Pakistan and how they became 
normal, this article argues that there are strong reasons for the Pakistani state to shut down the Internet 
that have little to do with security or public order. Instead, Internet shutdowns are a strategic measure to 
prevent mobilization and prop up the state, as well as a disciplinary measure to prevent marginalized 
“others” from taking part in the national political debate and documenting their grievances. This separation 
quite literally creates digital boundaries not just to the outside world but within communities themselves, 
limiting their ability to communicate among themselves. As such, it is a much more repressive authoritarian 
practice governance mechanism than simply censoring certain websites or denying a community access to 
the Internet.  
 
As noted above, the intention of sabotaging accountability runs through both intended effects of 
the shutdowns and their implementation. By (a) preventing the contestation of shutdowns by providing an 
untransparent and incontestable process around the decision to shut down communications, and (b) shutting 
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down communications in Balochistan over an extended period of time, making it far more difficult to 
document the violent anti-insurgency campaigns there, both mechanisms serve to sabotage accountability 
for the actions of the Pakistani government and, in particular, its military and security services.  
 
Although some attempts were made to trace the process around the development of Internet 
shutdowns as a political measure, further work is still clearly required in this area. Although the ideas of a 
military origin of Internet shutdowns in Northern Ireland seem plausible, they require further documentation 
and research to clarify the exact causal mechanism. What is clear, however, is the highly political usage of 
shutdowns within the context of a political struggle. It seems relatively clear that this concept became 
popular after the shutdown events in Cairo and has since been commonly used throughout Africa and Asia. 
Most recently, Cameroon has begun to emulate Egypt and Pakistan and conducted a shutdown for more 
than three months in the English-speaking part of an otherwise French-speaking country (Kazeem, 2017). 
While the English-speaking part of Cameroon is not as heavily marginalized as Balochistan is in Pakistan, 
similar dynamics of disconnecting the region from the national political debate, punishing them for protesting 
the national government, demanding greater independence, and preventing further political mobilization 
are also evident in Cameroon.  
 
Beyond Cameroon and Pakistan, there is an urgent need for scholars not just to look at Internet 
shutdowns technically from afar but to engage with the local political dynamics of how shutdowns happen. 
Only when the authoritarian dynamics of shutdowns and communicative ruptures are better understood will 




On the February 26, 2018, as this article was being finalized, the Pakistan High Court declared 
Internet shutdowns in Pakistan “as illegal and disproportionate response to security threats” (Bytes for All, 
2018, para. 1). The judgement suggests that the concept of national security is being overextended and 
that justifying Internet shutdowns using “apprehensions relating to public safety, law and order or the 
happening of an untoward incident” (Minallah, 2018, p. 12) can be justified by “by no stretch of the 
imagination” (Minallah, 2018, p. 12). Internet shutdowns could only be justified under a national state of 
emergency following an official “Proclamation of Emergency by the President of Pakistan” (Minallah, 2018, 
p. 13). Although the High Court decision was able to hold the PTA accountable as the actual author of legal 
requests to Internet providers, it does not even mention the NCMC or their decision-making process. Thus, 
while the High Court was able to prevent civilian authorities to account, whether this constitutes actual 
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